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BOOK REVIEW 
ROBERT GEORGE'S THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: 
LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS 
Jeffrey C. Tuomala t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although Robert George's book The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, 
and Morality in Crisis1 was published several years ago, it has continuing 
significance and particular interest for those teaching and studying at Liberty 
University School of Law. 
George believes that Western civilization's real clash is not an external 
one against the Islamic world or the Confucian East. Rather, it is an internal 
clash between the Judea-Christian worldview and secularist orthodoxy? He 
states that this internal clash has been falsely cast as a clash between faith and 
reason.3 By faith George means belief in divine revelation or other religious 
authority and by reason he seems to mean non-religious philosophy.4 George 
asserts that secularists are mistaken in their claims that the Christian 
worldview is defensible only on the basis of faith and that only the defense of 
secularism is based on reason. 5 George believes that there are basic starting 
assumptions that contending orthodoxies hold in common and from which 
both Christians and secularists can reason. He sets for himself the primary 
task of proving that the Christian worldview, and especially certain of its 
moral values, can be proved superior by reason, in particular "publicly 
accessible reasons," without appeal to divine revelation.• 
There has been something of a natura! law revival among more traditional 
Catholics and also a growing interest in natural law (usually vaguely defmed) 
among evangelical Christians. Professor George is among the leading 
contemporary proponents of natural law jurisprudence in the Roman Catholic 
tradition. Most students and professors at Liberty University School of Law, 
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Liberty University 
School of Law. 
1. ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY 
IN CRISIS (200 l ). 
2. I d. at 3. George seems to use the tenns "orthodoxies" and ''worldviews" 
interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 3-4. 
3. Id. at 4. 
4. See id. at 4, 304-05. 
5. Id. at 4. 
6. /d. at 7. 
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in common with George, see the clash between Christian and secularist 
worldviews as a basic dynamic in modern society. They generally share the 
belief that a major sonrce of crisis in law, religion, and morality is the decline 
of adherence to the Christian worldview and failnre of Christians to live 
consistently with that worldview. George encourages fellow Catholics to 
recognize that evangelical Christians are their "true friends" in the cultnre 
wars, particularly those battles waged in defense oflife. 7 
Students and faculty at Liberty desire to offer a reasoned defense of what 
they understand to be the Christian worldview, a defense that instructs and 
strengthens those within the faith. They also hope to persuade secularists of 
the truth of the Christian worldview and its moral values. It is no secret that 
differences exist within Christendom, not only between Catholics and 
Protestants but also among Protestants, which determine their understanding 
of the Christian worldview, its authoritative sonrces, and the proper means of 
defending it. Facially, there is a tension between Professor George's natnral 
law methodology of defending the "Christian worldview" without an appeal 
to revelation and the Liberty University School of Law Mission Statement, 
which states that the school "exists to equip futnre leaders in law with 
superior legal education in fidelity to the Christian faith expressed through 
the Holy Scriptures." Given the many historical differences among 
Christians as to the proper means of offering an apology for the Christian 
faith, 8 it should not be surprising that these differences should also arise when 
the apologetic task is extended to defending the Christian worldview as it 
applies to questions of public policy, law, and government. 
One of the weaknesses of The Clash of Orthodoxies is that it does not 
clearly define what components comprise a worldview. It is fair to assume 
that worldview essentials include positions on metaphysics," epistemology, 10 
and morals. 11 Metaphysics and epistemology have a certain primacy over 
morals. The way in which one reasons about morals and, in large measnre, 
the particular moral positions one holds logically follow from one's 
metaphysics and epistemology. Conversely, extreme moral differences 
7. /d. at 296. 
8. See CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE REFORMED PASTOR AND MODERN THOUGIIT 1-36 
(1971) for an evaluation ofthe major Roman Catholic and Protestant approaches. 
9. Metaphysics is that branch of philosophy that deals with questions of being or the 
ultimate nature of reality. Topics include the nature of man and the issues or antinomies 
between free will and determinism, and universals and particulars. 
10. Epistemology deals with theories of knowledge and offers answers to the question, 
"How do we know?" 
11. Morals deal with the questions of duties and the rightness or wrongness of actions. 
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among people are fairly strong indicators that fundamental differences of 
metaphysics or epistemology exist among them. 
George draws a sharp contrast between Christian and secularist 
worldviews on several important moral issues, including abortion and 
euthanasia. He goes so far as to contrast these orthodoxies as the "culture of 
life" and the "culture of death."12 In terms of epistemology, however, George 
makes no necessary distinction between proper Christian reasoning and 
secularist reasoning about public issues." George not only believes that it is 
unnecessary to appeal to revelation or other religious authority in 
philosophical debate over public issues; he apparently believes that it is 
wrong to do so. 14 He believes that the clashing orthodoxies share an 
epistemology based on the autonomy of human reason." Although George 
draws certain distinctions between Christian and secularist metaphysics, 16 he 
ignores the most basic factors that distinguish the Christian worldview from 
all others-that God alone as Creator is independent and self -contained and 
that all men as creatures stand in a personal relationship with Him either as 
covenant keepers or covenant breakers. George sharply contrasts secularist 
and Christian views of human nature in some respects, and he repeatedly 
makes those differences foundational to his moral arguments regarding 
sexual morality and the sanctity of life. He also bnilds a case that secularist 
errors regarding human nature entail a denial of free will17 and objectivity of 
morals values; 18 however, he offers no satisfYing resolution to the basic 
antinomy between free will and determinism that every worldview must try 
to resolve. 
George's argument in defense of certain moral positions is built entirely 
upon man's understanding of himself, without appeal to God's revelation and 
without reference to the fact that man is personally accountable to God, who 
is his Creator and Judge. Because George does not make the doctrine of 
creation central to his argument, and because his epistemology in relation to 
public issues does not differ from that of secularists, the debate is more of a 
hard-fought intramural sparring match than a clash of orthodoxies. This is 
not to minimize the significance of the differences between orthodoxies on 
life and marriage issues that George addresses; however, his neglect of the 
12. GEORGE, supra note I, at 39-40, 132. 
13. See id at 169 ("The natural law is . .. a law that is in principle accessible to human 
reason and not dependent on ... divine revelation."). 
14. Id. at 63-64. 
15. Id. at 37. 
16. Id. at 20, 34-36. 
17. Id. at 16-18. 
18. Id. at 18-19. 
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Creator-creature distinction makes it more difficult to offer a reasoned 
explanation for those differences, given the metaphysical and epistemological 
similarities of the competing orthodoxies. 
Christian metaphysics and epistemology go hand in hand, and they differ 
from those of all other worldviews. Only in Christianity does a clear 
metaphysical distinction stand between the Creator and His creation.19 God 
alone is independent and self-sufficient, and He alone has exhaustive 
knowledge of the universe. There is no self-interpreting factuality or law; 
they can be truly known only as God interprets and reveals them No natural 
law exists or reveals itself independently of God or is equally ultimate with 
Him. All men are dependent upon God for their knowledge of the universe, 
and God reveals Himself and His basic moral standards to all men through 
the created order external to man and also in each individual's conscience.20 
Evangelical Christians usually refer to this as general revelation." Through 
general revelation, all persons know God's basic moral law, and they know 
that they stand judged for violating it?' No one, not even the most zealous 
secularist, is without knowledge of God as both Creator and Judge. 
Although God's law is clearly revealed to all men, they suppress and 
distort it, and in their disobedience, they are increasingly given over to sin 
and eventually become blind to it.23 Though man is created in the image of 
God, his whole nature, including his powers of reason, is corrupted as a result 
of the Fall.24 Even before man's Fall into sin and the resulting corruption of 
his intellect, affections, and will, he needed special revelation.25 Since the 
Fall, all men are in desperate need of the special revelation provided in 
Scripture?6 This special revelation expressly sets out moral standards.'7 
Moreover, the Gospel is contained only in this special revelation, and 
preaching of the Gospel is the appointed instrument of salvation?8 The 
19. "A doctrine which was not developed by pagan thinkers, but which was held by 
Augustine in common with other Christian writers, was that of the creation of the world out 
of nothing by God's free act." 2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PIDLOSOPHY 74 
(1950). 
20. See Psalm 19; Romans 1:18-20; 2:15. All biblical citations are to the New 
International Version. 
21. See VAN TIL, supra note 8, at 4-8. 
22. See Romans I :32. 
23. See Romans 1:21-25. 
24. See Romans 3:10-1.8. Compare man's condition as described in Romans 8:6-8 with 
his condition as described in Romans 12:2. 
25. See, e.g., Genesis 1:28. 
26. See Romans 7:7. 
27. See, e.g., Matthew 5:21-7:16; 22:37-40. 
28. See Romans 10:14-17. 
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power of the Holy Spirit restores men to life spiritually and converts them 
from the statns of covenant breakers to covenant keepers.29 These essential 
tenets are missing from George's treatment of the Christian worldview and its 
clash with secularism. Only with these Christian worldview correctives can 
the deficiencies of belief regarding human natnre, free will, and objectivity, 
which George rightly charges to secularism's account, be remedied.30 And 
only by acknowledging these correctives can one understand why so many 
would choose the cultnre of death over life and why autonomous human 
reason is not the sword of truth31 appointed to win this clash. 
George arranges the fifteen chapters of The Clash of Orthodoxies in three 
sections: "The Public Square," "The Courts," and "The Church." Each 
section deals with discourse in one of these forums. Because the chapters 
were written essentially as stand-alone essays or separately published articles, 
the book is sometimes redundant and does not systematically develop the 
basic theses. Recurrent themes include two complexes of related moral 
issues. The first complex I refer to as "life issues," primarily involving 
abortion, but also infanticide, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. George gives 
these issues great attention in all three sections. The second complex I refer 
to as "marriage issues," including homosexual marriage, non-marital and 
extramarital sex, and pornography. These issues comprise the greatest 
portion of Section One and one chapter of Section Three. The relationship 
between faith and reason is also a dominant theme. 
II. SECTION ONE-THE PuBLIC SQUARE 
In Section One (Chapters One through Six), George argues for the 
Christian view of marriage and for the right to life of unborn children. The 
first chapter provides a fairly comprehensive overview of his defense of life 
and marriage by appeal to reason only. The chapter also provides an 
overview of his critique of the secularists' view of human natnre and 
resulting errors regarding free choice and objectivity of morals that result 
from that view. The next three chapters give more expansive treatment of 
three themes introduced in Chapter One-the right to life, in particular the 
right of the unborn; the proper way to argue in the public square, from reason 
without appeal to revelation; and the defense of marriage as one man and one 
woman. Chapters 5 and 6 then treat the problem of pornography. 
In Chapter One, George identifies several issues over which Christian and 
secularist morality clash. In addition to the life and marriage issues, he 
29. See Romans 9:25; Revelation 21:3. 
30. VAN TtL, supra note 8, at 76-77,86-87. 
31. See Ephesians 6:17 (''Take ... the sword ofthe spirit, which is the word of God."). 
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highlights the conflict over "the place of religion and religiously informed 
moral judgment in public life."32 George develops this point to a limited 
degree, stating that 
orthodox secularism stands for the strict and absolute separation 
of not only church and state, but also faith and public life: no 
prayer . . . in public schools; no aid to parochial schools; no 
displays of religious symbols in the public square; no legislation 
based on the religiously informed moral convictions of 
legislators or voters.33 
George does not demonstrate how reason would establish the Christian 
worldview perspective on these public-life matters in the manner that he does 
regarding the life and marriage issues. It would be extremely interesting, for 
example, to see how reason and natural law stake out the jurisdictional 
boundaries between church and state, given that the church as the body of 
Christ has a particular mission in the world and operates not in the realm of 
nature but of grace. It seems that, for George, the Church's nature, purpose, 
and jurisdictional authority would be known only by revelation. Likewise, it 
would be instructive for George to demonstrate how reason and natural law 
justifY the placement of education within the jurisdiction of the state. He 
further describes the secularist view: 
Secularism aims to privatize religion altogether, to render 
religiously informed moral judgment irrelevant to public affairs 
and public life, and to establish itself, secularist ideology, as the 
nation's public philosophy. 
. . . Secularists are in favor of a "religious freedom" that allows 
everyone to believe as he wishes, but claims based on this ''private 
faith" must not be the grounds of public policy. Policy must be 
based on what secularists have lately come to call "public 
reason. "34 
George's criticism of the secularist view that the voice of faith and religion 
should be excluded from the public square creates an apparent conflict with a 
basic thesis of his book-that Christian morality can be vindicated by reason 
and that appeals should not be made to religious authority. In Chapter Three, 
"God's Reasons," George says that appeals to religious authority rather than 
32. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 4. 
33. !d at6. 
34. Id at 6-7. 
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public reason have no place in "philosophical debates about public policy."35 
Instead, he says, "I believe that public policy should be based on 'public 
reasons.' ... [This] idea ... strikes me as, well, reasonable."36 He does not 
explain whether his assertions are based on self-evident truth, revealed truth, 
or something else. 
On the one hand, George faults secularists for wanting to exclude 
religiously informed moral judgments from public life and to limit the 
discussion to "public reasons," while on the other hand, he states that it is 
reasonable to limit public debate to "public reasons" and that appeals to 
religious authority have no place in those debates. This confusion for the 
reader recurs throughout the book. For example, in Chapters Seven and 
Eight under the section titled "The Courts," he deals extensively with Papal 
encyclicals in making the point that human laws contrary to natural law are 
not law and that there is a duty to oppose or even resist them. 37 In Chapters 
Twelve and Fourteen, in the section titled "The Church," George deals with 
the failure of Catholic public officials and other laymen to submit to the 
teaching authority of the church's magisterium, particularly on the issue of 
abortion." 
George's reasoned defense of the superiority of the Christian view on life 
issues is two-pronged. The first prong is based primarily on the assertions 
that life is intrinsically good,39 that the human person is a dynamic unity,'0 
and that all human life is equal in value.41 The second prong of his defense 
has two parts. The first part is that the secularist position "makes nonsense of 
the experiences all of us have in our activities of being dynamically unified 
actors.'"'2 The second part demonstrates that the secularist view of human 
nature entails a denial of free choice43 and undermines the objectivity of 
morality and human rights. 44 
George begins his defense of the Christian view with the central 
proposition "that human life is intrinsically, and not merely instrumentally, 
35. /d. at 63. 
36. I d. 
37. Jd. at 131-35. 
38. Jd. at 253-58, 297-302. 
39. Jd. at4, 8, 14. 
40. Jd. at 9. 
41. Jd. at 14. 
42. Jd. at 9-11. 
43. Jd. at 17. 
44. Jd. at 18-19. 
84 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:77 
good and therefore morally inviolable.''" George states that knowledge of 
the truth that life is intrinsically good "does not presuppose Christian faith" 
but is known by "rational, self -critical reflection.',... It is not clear what 
"rational, self-critical reflection" is, but certainly he wants to avoid falling 
into the subjectivism of Cartesian rationalism.47 The intrinsic goodness of 
life and marriage appear to be self -evident truths that are starting points in the 
reasoning process and thus neither require, nor are amenable to, demonstrable 
proof'' 
In large measure, George's defense of the proposition that human life is 
intrinsically good is based on his critique of the secularist view of the nature 
of man, which "entails a metaphysical dualism of the person and the body.'"'9 
Stated another way, the secularist believes that "the 'person' is the conscious 
and desiring 'self' as distinct from the body which may exist (as in the case 
of pre- and post-conscious human beings) as a merely 'biological,' and, thus, 
sub-personal, reality."50 Thus, if a terminally ill "self' or "person" no longer 
desires to be burdened by a body, the self may exit the body (suicide).51 
Logically, pre-conscious (unborn child) and post-conscious (comatose adult) 
humans, having only bodies and not selves, may be aborted or euthanized. 52 
George traces this false view of the duality of human nature to Hume, who 
famously wrote: "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and may never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them. "53 
By contrast, George asserts that the Christian view of the human person is 
one of"a dynamic nnity of body, mind, and spirit."54 Thus, it is wrong to kill 
anyone based on a false dualism between bodily being and personhood. 55 
The Christian view of man additionally espouses the proposition that all men 
are equal; therefore, their level of consciousness does not change their 
45. ld. at 4. It appears that George equates "intrinsic good" with "basic human good." 
See id. at 11. He identifies marriage as an intrinsic good and as a basic human good. /d. It 
would seem that life is an equally basic good as marriage. 
46. Id at 14-15. 
47. See id at 34. Descartes is famous for the maxim "I think, therefore I am." COLIN 
BROWN, PHILOSOPHY & THE CHRISTIAN FAITH: A HISTORICAL SKETCH FROM THE MIDDLE 
AGES TO THE PRESENT DAY 50-51 (1968). His philosophy "symbolized a retreat into the 
individual self-consciousness as the one sure starting-point in philosophy." !d. at 52. 
48. Cf GEORGE, supra note I, at 14. 
49. Id at 9. 
50. Id. 
51. Id 
52. ld at 41. 
53. Id at 15. 
54. Id at9. 
55. Id at 8-9. 
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value. 56 Like life and marriage, equality appears to be a self-evident truth. 57 
George notes that secularists do not live consistently with their dualistic view 
of human nature, but operate in their daily lives as if each of them were a 
dynamic unity. 58 
An important part of George's defense of the Christian worldview is his 
explanation of how the falsity ofHume's view ofhurnan nature necessitates a 
denial of free choice and undermines objective morality. Hume portrays 
reason as enslaved to passions, thus making reason merely an instrument to 
satisfY personal desires.59 Reason is therefore not free to determine and 
choose what is right.60 The implication ofHume's view of human nature, as 
George notes, is that because passions and desires are by their very nature 
subjective, they can provide no objective basis for morals and human rights."1 
George does not deny the potential of passions to affect the reasoning 
process, nor does he deny that men often use reason in an instrumental 
fashion to rationalize what they want to do."2 However, he does not believe 
that reason should be enslaved to passion."3 Rather, George believes that 
reason has an independent power or motive to identifY what is good and to 
order the passions so that they desire the good.64 George writes, "Emotion or 
passion, when rightly ordered, supports what reason commends and helps us 
to accomplish the morally good ends that we have basic reasons to pursue.',., 
Free choice, he believes, is premised on the ability to act on reasons not 
reducible to desire.66 
George begins his defense of the Christian view of marriage as a "two in 
one flesh" nnion of a man and a woman by expressly identifYing marriage as 
"a basic human good. "67 Marriage, as with life, he writes, is an intrinsic 
good, not merely an instrumental good."' Because marriage is itself an end, it 
must not be viewed as a means to other ends such as the procreation of 
56. Id. at 14. 
57. ld. 
58. Id. at 9-10. 
59. ld. at 15. 
60. ld. at 16-18. 
61. Id. at 18-19,36-37. 
62. Id. at 16. 
63. Id. 
64. ld. at 33, 65. 
65. Id. at 16. 
66. Id. 
67. !d. at II. 
68. ld. 
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children or expression oflove_69 These truths, George believes, are known by 
reason and are understandable apart from revelation. 70 
Central to George's analysis of the various issues of sexual morality, 
including traditional marriage, homosexual marriage, sodomy, adultery, and 
fornication, is his understanding of human nature as described above. The 
human person is "a dynamic unity of body, mind, and spirit."71 In fact, 
George believes that the psychosomatic unity of the person is a basic human 
good. 72 Thus, for the individual, the human body does not exist 
independently of the person. Marriage involves a dynamic unity of a 
different sort. Reproductive-type sexual acts in marriage "are the biological 
matrix of the multi-level (bodily, emotional, dispositional, spiritual) sharing 
of life and commitment."" The biological union of the sexual act "con-
summates and actualizes [the] marriage," the two becoming one flesh.74 
Because reproduction is the one human activity that cannot be engaged in 
alone, it has the unique capacity to unite a man and woman in marriage. 75 
The married couple becomes a single organism for reproductive purposes. 76 
Because homosexual relations do not involve reproductive-type sexual acts, it 
is impossible for those acts to effect a marriage relationship. 77 
At points, George seems to equate reproductive sexual acts with 
marriage.78 However, because he believes that fornication is immora179 and 
apparently does not effect a marriage between a man and a woman, there 
must be some additional element essential to a marriage. Presumably, that 
element is the exchange of vows that a husband and wife make. It is curious 
that George makes no mention of marriage as a covenantal relationship 
between a man and a woman. However, it would seem to be the absence of 
covenantal vows that explains why fornication constitutes immorality and 
does not effect a marriage. The same rationale would explain why adultery 
constitutes illegal and immoral behavior and does not effect a polygamous 
rnarnage. 
69. !d. at 12, 80-81. 
70. !d. at II. 
71. !d. at 9. 
72. !d. at 12. 
73. /d. 
74. !d. at II. 
75. Id. at 79. 
76. !d. at 12. 
77. !d. at 268-69. 
78. See id at 78-79 ( .. [T]he point of sex ... is marriage itself, considered as a bodily 
('one-flesh') union of persons consummated and actualized by acts that are reproductive in 
type."). 
79. !d. at 102-03. 
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Whereas, in George's view, marital reproductive-type sexual relations 
unif'y two separate persons, all non-marital sexual acts and all non-
reproductive sexual acts, even of married couples (e.g., sodomy), result in the 
self-alienation and disintegration of the person, who is a psychosomatic 
unity. 80 These illicit acts effect a disintegration of the person by instru-
mentalizing sex; i.e., the body is made simply a means to the end of 
achieving pleasure.81 Again, basic to George's defense of Christian morality, 
this time on matters of sexuality, is his rejection ofHume's false depiction of 
the human body as simply an instrument to maximize pleasure. The 
psychosomatic integrity of the person is disrupted in sexual acts lacking the 
common good of marriage, which can be achieved only by marital 
reproductive-type sexual relations.82 Sex within marriage may be sought for 
pleasure or to share affection, but only as it is engaged in for the good of the 
marriage can it be intrinsically good. 83 
Although this book review focuses in large measure on problems with 
George's articulation and defense of the Christian worldview, certainly 
evangelical Christians should have no serious disagreements with George's 
moral conclusions on life and marriage issues, at least to the extent that he 
addresses them. Abortion, suicide, assisted suicide, and euthanasia are but 
forms of murder. Non-marital sexual conduct and homosexual conduct are 
serious violations of morality or even criminal in nature. Homosexual 
marriage is not even possible. In light of these commonly held moral 
positions, the epistemological differences between George's understanding of 
the Christian worldview and the evangelical's understanding might not seem 
significant, but such is not the case. 
There is an intrinsically right starting point from which we should reason 
and engage the secularist in the public square, but it is not the starting point 
that George adopts. Scripture teaches that "[t]he fear of the Lord is the 
beginning of knowledge."84 This must be the starting point in all of our 
reasoning-a recognition of who God is and an understanding of our 
relationship to Him as creatures who are covenantally bound to Him and 
governed by His law. 85 The Christian must begin all of his thinking about 
law remembering who God is and what He has done--" 'I am the Lord your 
God, who brought you . . . out of the land of slavery.' "86 Furthermore, 
80. !d. at 12-13, 79. 
81. !d. 
82. !d. at 268-69. 
83. See id. at 12-13, 82. 
84. Proverbs 1:7. 
85. See Hebrews 8:10. 
86. Exodus 20:2; Deuteronomy 5:6. 
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Scripture commands the Christian to "[t]rust in the Lord with all your heart 
and lean not on your own understanding; in all your ways acknowledge 
him. "87 This includes the way in which the Christian defends the faith and 
the precepts of morality. When arguing in the public square, the Christian 
has the model that the Apostle Paul set when debating the Greek philosophers 
in the meeting of the Areopagus: 
"Men of Athens! . . . God who made the world and everything in 
it is the Lord of heaven and earth. . . . [H]e himself gives all men 
life and breath and everything else. From one man he made every 
nation of men . . . . [l]n him we live and move and have our 
being. . . . [H]e commands all people everywhere to repent. For 
he has set a day when he will judge the world with justice by the 
man he has appointed. He has given proof of this to all men by 
raising him from the dead. "88 
Clearly, the Greeks had never heard anything like this before. 89 Their 
response was mixed-some sneered, others wanted to hear more, and some 
believed.9{) 
George commends John Finnis' approach for engaging in public debate 
over abortion. He tells us that Finnis and his opponent "did not proceed from 
'incompatible first assumptions.' ,m Their compatible first assumption was 
human rationality.92 fu other words, they started from the assumption of 
autonomous reason and the assumption that nature, including human nature, 
is self-interpretive. George, in effect, rejects the proposition that "[t]he fear 
of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge."93 He appears to believe 
something of the opposite-that knowledge of the natural world gained by 
reason points us to God, who will then reveal Himself if we ask. George's 
operative assumption in matters of public policy seems to be that we know in 
order that we may believe, rather than that we believe in order that we might 
know.94 Accordingly, he writes: 
87. Proverbs 3:5-6. 
88. Acts 17:22-31. 
89. Acts 17:18-21. 
90. Acts 17:32-34. 
91. GEORGE, supra note l,at68. 
92. Id at 68-69. 
93. Proverbs 1:7. 
94. Anselm said, "He who will not believe will not understand." Letter of Anselm to 
Pope Urban I!, in 10 A SCHOLASTIC MISCELLANY: ANSELM TO 0CKHAM 97, 97-98 (Eugene 
R. Fairweather ed. & trans., 1956). 
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For my part, I am hopeful that people who come to see that 
the Humean tradition has been wrong, and that the Judea-Christian 
tradition has been right all along, about the possibilities of free 
choice, rationally motivated action, and objective moral truth, will 
soon come to the realization that these possibilities point beyond 
themselves to a more-than-merely-human source of meaning and 
value, a divine ground of human intelligence and free will who 
freely discloses Himself to us when we are prepared to open our 
minds-and hearts-to Him.95 
89 
As the discussion about morals and natural law moves to issues beyond 
life and marriage, the significance of these differing views regarding the 
autonomy of human reason and the necessity of special revelation become 
more pronounced. For example, George states that "every Catholic should 
be, as Pope John Paul II himself certainly is[,] an old-fashioned liberal."96 He 
describes some of the major tenets of this brand of liberalism in Chapter 
Twelve. These tenets include limited government, private property, market 
economy, religious liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights.97 For 
the most part, he makes no attempt to establish these tenets by the careful 
reasoning process that he applies to life and marriage issues. In fact, he relies 
quite heavily on papal and other church teaching without indicating whether 
those teachings are in turn based on Scripture, tradition, or philosophy.98 
George's basic thesis that the Christian worldview on moral issues can be 
defended without appeal to revelation entails or fosters several fundamental 
errors. First, George's worldview entails a faulty understanding of human 
nature, its capacities and basic disposition after the Fall, and the efficient 
means of remedying man's moral error. Second, George's worldview and his 
means of defending it promote a tendency to view natural law as inhering in 
nature in such a way that law is independent of God or even that God is 
actually dependent on law that inheres in nature. 
Differences in epistemology are correlative, at least in part, with differing 
views of human nature. George's view that autonomous reason is sufficient 
to win the day entails errors regarding man's nature after the Fall and the 
means God has appointed for countering the effects of the Fall. Although 
Hume's view of the duality of human nature is certainly erroneous, and 
George's analysis ofHume's view is to some degree corrective, it is not fully 
Christian. Because it is not fully Christian, he is not likely to offer an 
95. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 38. 
96. Id. at 257. 
97. !d. at 232. 
98. See id. at 233-40. 
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effective remedy. Satisfactory answers must be given to the following 
questions: Why do secularists draw the wrong conclusions about such 
fundamental issues as life and marriage? How must secularists change their 
thinking in order to reason and act rightly? 
Although George professes a belief in the doctrine of sin;• his view 
appears to be more semi-Pelagian than Augustinian. Semi-Pelagians do not 
view man's affections, will, and reason to be as severely corrupted by 
Adam's Fall as Augustine taught.100 They believe that man's reasoning 
powers in particular were left relatively uncorrupted after the Fall, though 
reason continues to face the resistance of concupiscence. 101 This view of 
human nature helps to explain why George can describe secularists with 
whom he clashes and whom he finds responsible for instituting the "culture 
of death" as being good-willed102 and honest.103 Many secularists, he 
believes, try their best to reason correctly,104 and in the case of the cultural 
elite, they are extremely intelligent. 105 George states that "errors of reason 
must be responsible for anyone's failure to arrive at the morally correct 
positions."106 He lists as possible roots of such errors "[i]gnorance of, or 
inattention to, certain relevant facts or values," "[p ]rejudice or other 
subrational influences," and "logical failures or other errors in the reasoning 
process."107 
What is the solution to the problems that lead to errors in reason regarding 
the most fundamental of all basic human goods-life and marriage? George 
believes that reason itself provides the motive force for doing what is right, 
and even though our passions might lead us astray, those passions should be 
harnessed and molded by reason to desire what is right. 108 Reason itself 
should be able to direct us to the right ends and presumably be able to 
motivate us.109 Is the remedy then simply to drive home the self-referential 
99. /d. at 16. 
100. 2 CHARLES HODGE, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 164-73 (Eerdmans 1979) (1873). 
101. Cj VAN TIL, supra note 8, at 88 (Aquinas' semi-Pelagian theology "holds to a 
measure of human autonomy''); id. at 91-92; HODGE, supra note 100, at 171-73. 
102. See GEORGE, supra note 1, at 50, 65-66. George implies that members of civil 
society in general are good-willed, and this would seem to include his secularist opponents 
in the debate. 
103. /d. at40. 
104. /d. 
I 05. !d. at 39. 
I 06. ld. at 54. 
107. /d. 
108. !d. at 16. 
109. !d. at 16, 65. 
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inconsistencies of secularist thought, pile on more facts, and implore 
secularists to work harder at reasoning and self-critical reflection? 
Perhaps it is helpful to consider the situation of Ronald Dworkin, whose 
positions George considers and challenges. George identifies Dworkin as 
one of the most notable liberal political theorists of our day and squarely in 
the camp of secularist orthodoxy.110 Dworkin has written about and 
advocated positions in favor of abortion and assisted suicide, which he even 
labels "choices for death."m Presumably, he is among the good-willed, 
honest, and striving-to-reason-correctly secularists. Why then is Dworkin not 
able to understand the intrinsic and equal value of all human life? If reason 
breaks down for Dworkin, what hope is there for others? If such basic human 
goods such as life, marriage, equality, and psychosomatic integrity are not 
demonstrable, how does one get Dworkin to engage in more strenuous and 
serious "rational, self-critical reflection"?112 Certainly he has seen the facts 
and considered all the scientific arguments for the life of the unborn, and he 
is no doubt quite knowledgeable about Hume's dualistic views of human 
nature, its problems, and its implications regarding free choice and the 
objectivity of moral values. 
There is a different understanding of the Christian worldview from the one 
that George provides, and it gives a much better explanation of the problem 
and the remedy. First, Dworkin already does know that all human life is 
intrinsically good and equally valuable, and he knows that abortion is the 
intentional killing, indeed the murder, of innocent human beings.m He also 
knows that those who commit abortion are deserving of God's judgment.114 
God has plainly revealed this to him not just in Scripture, but in his 
conscience and through the created order as well.115 Perhaps Dworkin has 
suppressed and deuied that truth to the point that he in some way believes a 
lie, but the truth is plainly revealed nonetheless. Second, George is wrong to 
state that Dworkin and other pro-abortionists are honest or good-willed. 116 
They have clearly exchanged the truth about life and other basic human 
goods for a lie.m And, people who favor and promote the removal of 
protection of law from millions of unborn children cannot possibly be good-
110. Id. at 39. 
111. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMrniON: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND iNDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 3 (1993). 
112. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 15. 
113. See Romans 1:28-30. 
114. See Romans 1:32. 
115. See Romans 1:18-20; 2:15. 
116. Romans 3:11-18. 
117. See Romans 1:25. 
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willed. Even if George's purpose were simply to keep lines of 
communication open and conversation civil, these goals can be achleved 
without distorting the true nature of hls opponents' predicament. Secularists 
promoting the death of unborn children and homosexual marriage are lost in 
sin. The truth that God has revealed to them they suppress.118 They are 
enslaved to sin, including their powers of reason. Reason is not simply led 
astray by passions, and it is not prone to error due simply to its finitude. Its 
powers are corrupted by the Fall. Right reason begins with the renewal of the 
mind 119 that comes through conversion and regeneration. 120 
George seems to acknowledge that debates are not particularly effective in 
changing opponents' minds. He says that a debate probably will not lead to a 
"road-to-Damascus" experience for "people who are deeply committed 
emotionally to one side or the other."121 Paul's experience on the road to 
Damascus was an encounter with Jesus Christ. 122 All men start out at war 
with God, 123 though some, like Paul, are better educated and more committed 
to that war.124 They reject the truth and they want to upset the created 
order. 125 The remedy is radical. It calls for a change of heart. 126 In every 
forum where the Apostle Paul appeared---the public square, 127 the courts, 128 
and the church 129 -he pressed the claims of Christ. 
There is a still more basic metaphysical problem with George's defense: 
he fails to make the Creator-creature distinction fundamental to hls thought or 
at least to his argument. This failure contributes to his belief in the self-
sufficiency of autonomous reason as a starting point rather than the fear of 
the Lord as the starting point of reasoning. A danger that results from this 
approach is that man will view law as inhering in a kind of "nature" that has 
an origin and existence independent of the creation decrees of God. It 
introduces at least the appearance that nature, and by implication human 
nature, has an equal ultimacy with God. It also introduces a false assurance 
that the universe is comprehensible to man, at least in part, without God's 
118. See Romans 1:18. 
119. Romans 12:2. 
120. Romans 8:1-17. 
121. GEORGE, supra note 1, at 69 (alluding to Paul's conversion in Acts 9:1-19). 
122. See Acts 9:3-5, 17. 
123. Romans 5:10; 8:7. 
124. Acts 22:2-5. 
125. Romans 1:21-27. 
126. Ephesians 3:14-19; Ezekie/36:25-27. 
127. Acts 17:16-33. 
128. Acts 26:1-32. 
129. Acts20:17-38. 
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revelation. With the Enlightenment, the cultural elite came to view nature as 
operating according to laws independently of God's superintending 
providence. 130 And, since Darwin, the elite have come to view nature, of 
which man is no particularly distinct part, as evolving. Therefore, it stands to 
reason that the laws of nature, if there be such, are changing as well. 131 
George offers a further commendation for the manner in which John 
Finnis debated the issue of abortion. George states that even though Finnis 
believes that life begins at conception and in each case is created by God, 
"his argument never invoked, much less did it 'start from a belief in the direct 
agency of a personal God.' "132 The implication is that man can reason 
rightly and have true knowledge of the world because man and nature are in 
part independent of God. George's own language could be taken, or 
mistaken, as promoting a view of natural law that is independent of God and 
that equally binds God and man. He writes: 
But most pro-life advocates see abortion as a sin against God 
precisely because it is the unjust taking of innocent human life. 
That is their reason for opposing abortion; and that is God's 
reason, as they see it, for opposing abortion and requiring that 
human communities protect their unborn members against it. 
And, they believe, as I do, that this reason can be identified and 
acted on even independently of God's revealing it. 133 
Although marriage is inherently one man and one woman, and life may 
not be forfeited absent certain conditions, neither life nor marriage are 
intrinsically good in the sense that George seems to suggest. For example, 
human fulfilhnent is not an end in itself of marriage. That fulfillment never 
exists independently of reference to God. Basic human goods are instituted 
by God and have value for man ouly in reference to Him. This truth is 
captured in the answer to the first question of the Westminster Shorter 
Catechism: "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever."134 
Man's enjoyment, or human fulfilhnent, to use George's term, that comes 
with marriage is not self-referential. Life, marriage, study, and friendship are 
good only to the extent that they have reference to enjoyment of God. Even 
human life is not an end in itself, for "to live is Christ and to die is gain."135 
130. COLIN BROWN, PHILOSOPHY & TilE CHRISTIAN FAITH 74 (1968). 
131. See HERBERT W.liTUS, Goo, MAN, AND LAW: THE BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES 1-14 (1994) 
(discussing the prevailing modem evolutionary concept of law). 
132. GEORGE, supra note I, at 69. 
133. I d. at 67. 
134. WESTM!NSTERCONFESS!ON OF FAITH287 (Free Presbyterian Pub'ns 1958) (1646). 
135. Philippians 1:21. 
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ill. SECTION Two--THE COURTS 136 
Chapters Seven through Ten focus on the role of natural law in a legal 
system, primarily American constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on privacy (Griswold), abortion (Roe and Casey), and slavery 
(Dred Scott) provide most of the grist for discussion of natural law 
jurisprudence. Chapter Eleven then provides an overview of twentieth-
century jurisprudence, beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and 
highlighting two problems-the relationship of law and morality, and the 
basis for objectivity in law and human rights. 
Professor George believes that the Framers incorporated the natural law, in 
part, into the U.S. Constitution.137 The courts, when deciding cases, must 
therefore interpret and apply the natural law insofar as it has been written into 
the positive law.138 George states that the people have not delegated to the 
courts the power to enforce natural law that has not been reduced to positive 
law, even though he believes courts do have some lcind of lawmaking 
power. 139 The legislature, however, does have the power, and even the duty, 
to incorporate natural law into legislation.140 The courts would thereby also 
have the power to apply natural law that has been implemented by legislation. 
Presumably, the people can limit the legislature's jurisdictional reach by 
express constitutional prohibitions or by failure to delegate power over 
certain matters.141 George notes that Edwin S. Corwin believed that the 
English common law courts were not restricted in their ability to incorporate 
and apply the natural law.142 Therefore, that part of the common law that 
incorporated the natural law was to be applied as superior to conflicting acts 
of Parliament.143 The common law was, in effect, natural law reduced to 
written form in the courts' opinions. 144 If this is in fact the case, George's 
view of natural law in its relation to the American constitutional system 
seems to reduce the power of American courts, as compared to the powers of 
the historic common law courts, to apply the natural law. 
George illustrates how this plays out with the issue of abortion. He 
believes that sound arguments can be made that the federal courts should 
136. GEORGE, supra note I, at !25-228. 
137. Id. at !8!. 
138. Id. at !82. 
139. ld. at !75, !8!. 
!40. ld. at !82. 
14!. Id. at !75, !78. 
!42. Id. at !75. 
143. Id. 
!44. ld. at !75. 
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strike down state laws legalizing abortion. 145 Abortion is contrary to natural 
law, and the natural law regarding abortion has been incorporated into the 
Constitution, 146 firstly, because natural law defines persons as including all 
human beings, 147 and, secondly, because the Constitution requires equal 
protection of all persons.148 
This position on abortion and natural law places George at odds with 
Justice Scalia who opposes Roe v. Wade as a matter of constitutional law, 
though for a different reason. Scalia does not believe that the Constitution 
creates a right to abortion, but neither does he believe that it creates in unborn 
children a right to life that is enforceable by the federal courts.149 Therefore, 
Scalia holds that the matter of abortion is for the states to resolve through the 
democratic processes. 150 The Roe and Casey decisions are vilified under 
Scalia's view as products of anti-democratic judicial activism in that the 
Supreme Court simply made up a constitutional right to abortion that does 
not exist. 151 George's position that the Constitution arguably prohibits 
abortion in all fifty states therefore also faces the charge of anti-democratic 
judicial activism. George, of course, defends against this charge primarily 
through his argument that the Constitution itself recognizes the right to life. 152 
He further argues that his position is more truly democratic than Scalia's 
because democracy is not simply a procedure for choosing officials by 
majority vote; democracy contains certain inherent values including the equal 
dignity of all people.153 Democracy has a substantive component that 
demands equal protection of law. 
One of the main sources of authority that George cites in Section Two is 
the Pope,154 who seems to violate George's principle of not appealing to 
religious authority in public debate. George quotes from Evangelium Vitae 
issued by John Paul II: " 'laws which authorize and promote abortion and 
euthanasia are radically opposed not only to the good of the individual but 
also to the common good; as such they are completely lacking in juridical 
validity.' "155 Though George uses this passage to call for general citizen 
145. Id at 146. 
146. !d. at 175. 
147. !d. 
148. !d. at 147. 
149. !d. at 129. 
150. Id. at 130. 
151. !d. at 129. 
152. /d. at 146. 
153. /d. at 130, 146. 
154. See, e.g., id. at 128,131,132, 135,137-38, 147. 
155. Id. at 131. 
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resistance to laws that are contrary to morals, 156 he gives no clear iodication 
of how this applies to adjudication of cases. If somethiog is not law, it would 
seem that the courts could not apply it. Yet, George invokes the natural law 
for the proposition that the rule of law requires courts to apply those positive 
laws that are contrary to natural law .157 
The discussion regarding the applicability of natural law in positive legal 
systems would be advanced by distioguishing the different purposes for 
which the natural law might be utilized. One simple purpose would be to 
provide definitions of such terms as life and property. A second would be to 
provide general principles oflaw io cases where it is not reduced to statutory 
form. An example would be the application of the right of self-defense to a 
crime where there is no statute expressly providing for such. A third would 
be the creation of a cause of action in the courts for a cognizable wrong when 
there is not an express statutory cause of action. A fourth purpose would be 
to provide a methodology of reasoniog. For example, should rights be 
determioed by a rule-of-law methodology or by a utilitarian calculation of 
costs and benefits on a case-by-case basis? 
Arguably, the U.S. Constitution does expressly incorporate the natural law 
in a much more comprehensive fashion than George acknowledges. The 
people, through their constitutions, grant to the courts ')udicial power."158 
The term judicial has an essential meaniog fixed by natural law in much the 
same way as does the term person. The people may have the power to create 
a frame of government that provides for the appointment of officials and to 
establish their subject matter and geographical jurisdiction, but the people 
have no power to biod judges to do that which is wrong. 159 Judges, though 
they may owe their immediate appoiotment to the people, are nonetheless 
agents of God for justice, 160 and civil offices, like all powers and authorities, 
are ordaioed by God. 161 Inherent io the exercise of judicial power is the duty 
to interpret and apply the law, and this necessarily iocludes principles of 
natural law applicable in particular cases. George, however, claims that a 
156. Id. at 132-34. 
157. Id. at 179-80. 
158. E.g., U.S. CaNST. art. 11!. The archetype of the exercise of judicial power is 
revealed in Christ's atonement. See Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Christ's Atonement as the Model 
for Civil Justice, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 221,222 (1993). 
159. Acts 5:29. In the case of the apostles, the political sovereign was Caesar. Under the 
American system of government, the people are sovereign and the judges are their agents. 
Judges, like the apostles, must obey God when the political sovereign commands them to do 
wrong. Cf Acts 5:27-29. 
160. Romans 13:4. 
161. Ephesians 1:20-23. 
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constitution need not give the courts the power of judicial review. 162 That 
may be true, but if those institutions denominated as courts do not have the 
power of judicial review they would be executive bodies and not judicial 
bodies. While judges may be limited as to subject matter jurisdiction, and 
therefore are not given free rein to right every wrong someone might try to 
bring before them, they cannot be forced to apply that which is not law as 
though it were law. 
In Section Two, the problem that arises from George's failure to make the 
Creator-creature distinction foundational to his worldview reappears. George 
states that there is a "belief in an order of natural law and justice ... that is 
what it is because human nature, and therefore the human good, is what it is, 
and [a belief] that this moral order is constituted by principles accessible to 
reason that transcend tastes, preferences, or subjective will."163 Once again, 
this gives the appearance that inherent in nature, including human nature, is a 
law equally ultimate with God and independent of Him. This comes through 
in George's identification of Martin Luther King, Jr., as among the great 
natural law proponents. "[T]he violation of natural law, according to 
Reverend King, has its worst effects by distorting the character of human 
beings."164 If violation of the natural law is a breach of the law of a personal 
God with whom people have a covenantal relationship, rather than the law of 
impersonal nature, one would expect that the worst effect of breaking natural 
law would be that it provokes God's displeasure. 165 That is a perspective that 
judges, most of whom swear an oath in God's name, should have front of 
mind when deciding cases. They should be loath to bring God's judgment 
upon themselves and their country by applying that which is not law as 
though it were law. 
Chapter Eleven, "What Is Law?"166 provides a very useful sununary and 
analysis of some of the main streams of thought and problems addressed in 
twentieth century jurisprudence. Notably missing, however, is any treatment 
of Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence. Pound's jurisprudence, which 
calls upon the state to maximize the interests of the people, seems to be based 
on the same errors regarding human nature that mark secularist orthodoxy. 
Pound's satisfaction-of-interest jurisprudence is little more than a corporate 
attempt to satisfy the passions. 167 The problem is now exacerbated because 
162. GEORGE, supra note I, at 175. 
163. Id. at 164. 
164. Id. at 166. 
165. Romans 2:5; Revelation 19:11-21. 
166. GEORGE, supra note I, at 211-228. 
167. "First, therefore, there is the task of making an inventory of the wants, desires, 
claims, or demands which men assert and call upon the legal order to satisfy or to enable 
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law must serve as an instrument to satisfY a cacophony of competing 
passions.'68 Law and rights lose any objective basis, and now the person is 
not merely enslaved to his own passions, but is also subjected to a different 
form of determinism--state-ordered social engineering. 169 Governing 
officials (who somehow retain the power of free choice) use law as an 
instrument to create the kind of society that will maximize satisfaction of 
people's passions. The logic of an eternal and unchanging law is thus 
replaced by human experience, at least in the minds of Hohnes,170 his 
admirers, and jurisprudential descendants. George notes that Abraham 
Lincoln resolved the problem of the "relation between the time-bound 
historicity and . . . timeless rationality" through his understanding of the 
Declaration of Independence. The Declaration's assertion that all men are 
created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights reflects the 
evangelical Christian view of the importance of the Creator-creature 
distinction for law and of self-evident truth as known by general revelation.171 
Only with the Christian worldview that maintains a clear distinction between 
the Creator and creature can law (based on the principles of continuity and 
logic) and experience (which entails change and discontinuity) be 
harmonized. 
IV. SECTION THREE-THE CHURCH172 
Chapters Twelve and Fourteen focus in large measure on Roman Catholic 
public officials who are not obedient to the authority of the church, primarily 
on the issue of abortion. Chapter Thirteen responds to a Roman Catholic's 
argument that homosexual marriage is compatible with Christianity. Chapter 
Fifteen discusses Pope John Paul IT's encyclical Fides et Ratio. 
In the final section of his book, George speaks about the church and his 
message is directed primarily to the church, which in this case is the Roman 
Catholic Church. For reasons that would seem obvious, he is free to appeal 
to religious authority in support of positions that he takes on issues of public 
them to satisfY, of which, therefore the legal order must take account." Excerpt from Roscoe 
Pound, Contemporary Juristic Theory (1940), reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK 
H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 912 (2d ed. 
1995). 
168. Id. at 911 ("As the saying is, we all want the earth. There are many of us, but there 
is only one earth. It is the problem of social control so to line us up and order our endeavors 
to satisfy our desires .... "). 
169. ld. at 920, 922. 
170. GEORGE, supra note I, at 214. 
171. ld at 154. 
172. ld at229-316. 
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morality. It is interesting that for the ftrst time he devotes considerable 
attention to public issues beyond those of life and marriage. 173 The issues 
include democracy, religious liberty, free markets, private property, and 
human rights. 
At fust blush it makes sense that he would appeal to religious authority 
rather than pure reason since he is speaking to an audience that at least 
professes to recognize the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. How-
ever, it creates a problem once its adherents, especially public officials, return 
to engage others in the public square and in the courts. If their positions are 
formed on the basis of religious authority rather than reason, and appeals to 
religious authority are illegitimate in public debate, it would be impossible to 
address the seemingly secret bases upon which they form their positions. 
George really makes no attempt to demonstrate that each of the positions on 
this multitude of issues is equally defensible by autonomous human reason 
without appeal to religious authority. Nor does he tell the reader whether the 
Church's official pronouncements (in most cases papal encyclicals) are based 
on Scripture, tradition, or philosophic reasoning. 
George contrasts "old-fashioned liberals" with "contemporary liberals" on 
a variety of issues and states that the Pope is an old-fashioned liberal and that 
all Catholics should be as well.174 As stated above, old-fashioned liberals are 
those who believe in "religious freedom, political equality, constitutional 
democracy, the rule of law, limited government, private property, the market 
economy, and human rights."175 This, he writes, is the liberalism of 
America's Founders and its Constitution.176 While contemporary liberals at 
least claim adherence to some of these beliefs, by way of contrast they 
"defend large-scale government-run health, education, and welfare pro-
grams," "redistributive taxation policies," "affirmative action programs," 
redefinition of marriage, and abortion.177 This, he writes, is the liberalism of 
Teddy Kennedy and Mario Cuomo. 178 George makes a special point to prove 
his assertion that Pope John Paul II and Vatican II did, in fact, favor 
democracy179 and religious liberty. 180 
It appears that on several issues, in particular economics and education, the 
difference between old-fashioned liberals and contemporary liberals is more a 
173. Id. at 231-58. 
174. Id. at 257. 
175. Id. at 232. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 232-33. 
179. !d. at233-35. 
180. !d. at 235-36. 
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matter of degree than principle. For example, George commends provision 
of a social safety net/81 does not oppose publicly funded schools, 182 and 
promotes some kinds of economic regulation. 183 This vacillation is consistent 
with the Church's adherence to the principle of solidarity,184 which seems to 
favor government involvement in welfare, education, and redistribution of 
wealth schemes, and to the principle of subsidiarity, 185 which favors a 
multiplicity and vitality of non-government institutions. Little attention is 
given to drawing respective domains of these competing principles. 
George's discussion of issues other than life and marriage appears to be 
largely prologue to his treatment of the problem of Roman Catholic public 
officials who are pro-abortion.186 He recognizes the fact that contemporary 
liberals are generally pro-abortion and old-fashioned liberals are generally 
pro-life.187 George tries to convince his Roman Catholic readers, many of 
whom are probably contemporary liberal Democrats, that they can and 
should adhere to a pro-life position which is not necessarily incompatible 
with contemporary liberalism. 188 The question that George raises at the end 
of Chapter Eleven is, "Why don't Catholics obey the Church's teaching on 
abortion?" He concludes that the answer is, "They don't recognize the 
authority of the magisterium."189 
In Chapter Fourteen, George returns to the themes of pro-abortion public 
officials, church authorities, and the reasons for Catholics' unwillingness to 
submit to magisterial authority. He identifies Fr. Robert Drinan 190 --priest, 
former Congressman, and Georgetown law professor-as the person most 
responsible for conceiving the ''personally opposed but pro-choice" position 
that was popularized by Mario Cuomo.191 George also criticizes John 
Kennedy's 1960 speech to Protestant ministers in Houston as establishing the 
view that religion should be separated from public life. He writes, "Kennedy 
effectively declared his Catholic faith to be irrelevant to his public life." 192 It 
181. ld. at 127. 
182. See id. at 6 ("[O]rtbodox secularism stands for the strict and absolute separation of 
... faith and public life: no prayer, not even an Opportunity for silent prayer, in public 
schools .... "). 
183. Id. at 236. 
184. Jd. at 237,257-58. 
185. I d. at 237-38,257-58. 
186. ld. at 243-56. 
187. Id. at 243.245. 
188. Id. at252-53. 
189. Id. at 253-56. 
190. Id. at276-79. 
19!. Id. at 277. 
192. Id. at28l. 
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is hard to square this criticism with George's insistence that appeals to 
religious authority have no place in the public square. 
George's brief history of the public policy positions that the United States 
Catholic Conference has taken is quite interesting and especially informative 
for evangelicals who may fmd the workings of the Roman Catholic Church 
something of a mystery.' 93 The Conference was born in 1966 in the 
aftermath of Vatican II. 194 The Conference began issuing a large number of 
papers on nearly every important issue of public policy. George is critical of 
the actions of the Conference for several reasons, but for two in particular. 
First, the Conference addressed areas in which it had no special competence, 
making authoritative pronouncements at levels of particularity appropriate 
only for the prudence oflaymen.195 Second, by tying all issues together as a 
"seamless garment" or a "consistent ethic of life" the Conference provided 
Catholic pro-abortion politicians with cover.196 Because the Conference took 
many stands more consistent with contemporary liberalism, which pro-
abortion politicians could easily embrace and old-fashioned liberals could 
not, the pro-abortion politicians could claim to be more consistently pro-life 
than the truly pro-life politicians who tend to be old-fashioned liberals. 197 
George returns to the troubling question of why Roman Catholic public 
officials ignore the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.198 He concludes 
that the single factor most responsible for undermining the magisterium's 
authority is the theologians, "especially priest theologians and members of 
the women's religious orders."199 A more likely explanation for Catholics' 
pro-abortion stances is that they have failed to submit to an even more 
fundamental relationship, that of the creature to his Creator. The solution 
does not lie in pointing the theologians to the magisterium. They must be 
pointed to their Creator and lawgiver who holds them personally accountable 
and who will one day pronounce an eternal judgment on them?00 
V. CONCLUSION 
George's book The Clash of Orthodoxies does not lay a sound foundation 
upon which to build a truly Christian natural law jurisprudence. Although 
193. Seeid. 
194. Id at 282. 
195. !d. at 287-88. 
196. ld at288-90. 
197. Id at290. 
198. Id. at 297-302. 
199. Id. at 298. 
200. James 3:1; Revelation 21:8. 
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George is very aware of the common commitment of both serious Roman 
Catholics and evangelical Christians to fundamental moral positions on life 
and marriage issues, he does not try to minimize the differences on other 
matters, even foundational ones. His purpose is to engage secularists and 
beat them on common terms of autonomous human reason. The differences 
between George's foundational principles and those of evangelical 
Christianity are striking. 
